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One issue in the debate about the workings of the labour market 
is its degree of flexibility. In the case of Chile, the Asian crisis of late 1997 
led to a large increase in the unemployment rate, while the hourly wage 
index produced by the National Institute of Statistics rose steadily in real 
terms. This gave rise to the idea that wage rigidity might exist. The present 
article seeks to qualify this conclusion by detailing the limitations of the 
index when it comes to recording more volatile items of remuneration, and 
shows that the average monthly wage rose only by small amounts, while 
the minimum wage appears to have followed a different path from market 
wages. Lastly, this article discusses the advisability of setting a special 
minimum wage for the young and introducing a variable component into 
pay, two proposals that are often made in the interests of greater wage 
flexibility.Andrés Marinakis
Specialist in Labour Market Policies
and Labour Institutions,
International Labour Office (ILO),




C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6134
WAGE RIGIDITY IN CHILE  •  ANDRÉS MARINAKIS
After more than a decade of high and sustained 
growth, Chile was caught unaware by the Asian crisis 
in late 1997. One of its first effects was to increase the 
unemployment rate from 6% or so in 1997 to 9.8% in 
1999. Once growth resumed, net job creation was rather 
small and unemployment was slow to fall.
A number of analysts put this situation down to 
wage rigidity in Chile, arguing that this caused the 
burden of adjustment to fall on employment rather 
than being spread among all wage earners in the form 
of lower pay.1 This outcome is quite surprising in an 
economy that has less heavily regulated labour relations 
than the other countries in the region. The wage rigidity 
theory, which is based on very aggregate data, has been 
widely accepted in some academic circles and by the 
press generally.
According to data produced by the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE), real hourly wage growth 
fell but still averaged around 2.5% in 1998 and 1999, 
which is quite a high figure for the economic conditions 
of the time. Between 2000 and 2004, real hourly wages 
rose by between 1% and 2%, with an average of 1.5% 
(figure 1). Although these figures reveal a decline in 
growth rates in general, it could be argued that these 
rates were still high given the situation of economic 
recession and recovery in those years.
Another indicator used to buttress the wage 
rigidity argument is the evolution of the minimum 
wage. At the time of the Asian crisis, a system of 
three-yearly adjustment was in place, having been 
established when the economy was growing at 7% and 
there was no expectation of any crisis. The minimum 
wage increases in those years were very substantial in 
real terms, especially considering that the economy 
was stagnant.
Thus, the idea that wages in Chile are downwardly 
rigid comes mainly from these two items of information, 
i.e., developments in real hourly wage rates and the 
I
Introduction
 The opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily 
represent those of the organization to which he belongs. The author 
is grateful for the assistance of Jacobo Velasco in preparing the data 
presented in this article, and for the comments of an anonymous 
referee.
1 See Cowan and Micco (2005) and Céspedes and Tokman (2005).
FIGURE 1
Chile: Real hourly wage, 1995-2005
(Annual variations)
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real minimum wage. On the basis of this conclusion, 
three different policy proposals have arisen. Some 
economists suggest lowering the minimum wage. 
Others argue for the introduction of a special minimum 
wage for young people aged between 18 and 24, which 
would be lower than the general minimum wage. Lastly, 
others again suggest the introduction of a variable pay 
component based on performance or profit-sharing 
(Bravo, Larrañaga and Ramos, 2003).
The debate is by no means confined to these 
options, however. In fact, there seems to be a need to 
look more closely at the existing indicators in order to 
obtain a fuller picture of the situation.
Although the information on which the studies 
are based is accurate and these proposals may seem 
reasonable to some degree, a more detailed reading 
of the wage statistics methodology used and of the 
workings of the labour market reveals that wages in 
Chile are not as rigid as they are claimed to be and 
that some of the measures proposed are not in fact 
very suitable. The purpose of the present article is to 
justify this alternative view.
II
What does the National Institute of Statistics 
remuneration index measure?
The INE survey2 encompasses all economic activities 
except agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry, and 
is based on a sample of formal-sector establishments 
employing 10 or more workers.3 In other words, it 
covers about 40% of all those in work. From this 
segment it is also necessary to deduct a number of 
workers whose pay is not recorded. The survey does not 
include employees of external contractors, even if they 
are working for a company included in the survey.
The first thing to be said here is that the survey 
only records those who have a strict relationship of 
employment with the businesses surveyed. Furthermore, 
it only includes those who have a contract with the 
company and have worked for at least 20 hours during 
the week, and excludes those working for companies 
for a fixed period (to carry out specific projects, for 
example). Of all workers, then, the remuneration 
survey only covers the segment with the most stable 
employment, and thus with the least volatile pay.
The remuneration index covers compensation 
in money and kind received by workers under their 
employment contracts. It excludes components which 
behave variably over time or fluctuate greatly over the 
course of the year. These are:
— Overtime payments.
— Non-monthly bonuses and profit-sharing payments. 
Monthly bonuses and supplementary payments 
might include a qualifications allowance, payments 
for years of service, and isolated working or 
responsibility bonuses, all of them paid monthly.
— Additional payments for holidays and gratuities 
(INE, 1994).
In other words, the survey does not include bonus 
or incentive payments for production, productivity, 
attendance and/or punctuality unless they are paid 
regularly every month. The second point to be made, 
then, is that large variations are hardly to be expected 
in an index that only incorporates the most stable 
components of pay. In analysing the remuneration index 
data, therefore, it has to be remembered that this only 
records developments in the most regular components 
and not in total worker remuneration.
According to the 2002 labour survey (ENCLA), 
an average of 25% of total remuneration is variable. 
The percentage ranges from 14.5% in small enterprises 
2 INE (1993). This series has been available monthly since 1993, has 
national coverage, and presents information by occupational category 
and branch of activity. Its frequency makes it useful for analysing 
wage variability, by contrast with the National Socio-Economic 
Survey (CASEN), which was conducted every two years in the 1990s 
and has been triennial since 2000. Statistics generated from records 
like those of the Chilean Safety Association (Asociación Chilena de 
Seguridad) require some work to produce a sample of companies 
that is stable over time and to remove seasonal factors, as they were 
designed for specific purposes.
3 In the case of construction, it only covers firms employing 50 
or more.
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to 25.6% in medium-sized ones and 27.2% in large 
companies (Dirección del Trabajo, 2003). Furthermore, 
60% of medium-sized and large enterprises apply 
productivity incentive and bonus systems, so that a 
sizeable (and variable) percentage of total remuneration 
is not being included in the INE wage data.
A third point is that the remuneration data are 
averages for occupational groups in each establishment 
and not measurements for individual workers (INE, 
1994). Consequently, not only does the remuneration 
of the individuals covered vary substantially, but so do 
the number and composition of workers. For example, 
a company that kept its wages constant would show a 
rise in its remuneration index if it cut back the number 
of lower-paid employees working there.
If companies had dismissed mainly low-paid 
workers during the crisis years, this could have caused 
the remuneration index to rise in real terms, reflecting 
the composition of employment rather than wage 
developments.
In summary, the remuneration index deals with 
the most stable segment of formal-sector workers in 
companies with more than 10 employees and does 
not include the more variable components of pay. For 
methodological reasons, too, the changes in remuneration 
recorded can be affected when there is a disproportionate 
reduction in the number of lower-paid employees (the 
remuneration index rises) or in the number of higher-
paid employees (the remuneration index falls). All 
these factors need to be taken into account when wage 
developments in Chile are assessed.
III
How are wage increases determined?
There are major differences in the way employee 
remuneration is determined. One group of workers 
negotiate pay conditions through their unions or 
other representative bodies, leading to the signing of 
collective agreements or contracts. The terms agreed 
upon in collective instruments of this kind are binding 
as long as they remain in force.
Most collective instruments make two references 
to the calculation of wage increases. First, they establish 
an initial increase to be applied when the instrument 
comes into force. In the case of collective instruments 
signed during 2005 which included a clause of this type, 
the weighted average of this initial increase was 0.68%. 
Only 63% of workers covered by collective instruments 
benefited from this initial real adjustment clause.4
Second, there has been a decline in the initial real-
term increases established. As figure 2 shows, whereas 
the initial real-term increase averaged 1.43% in 1996 
and 1997, before the crisis, the figure had dropped to 
0.55% by 1999 and has since remained in the 0.6% 
to 0.7% range.
Again, most collective instruments include clauses 
providing for future increases tied to changes in the 
consumer price index (CPI). It is usually stipulated 
that adjustment will take place every 6 to 8 months 
(in 2005, the average was 6.7 months) and inflation 
is compensated for in full (in 2005, the average 
adjustment was 100% of the CPI). The future real-term 
adjustment clause was found in 70% of collective 
instruments.5
It is clauses like this which give rise to the belief 
that wages in Chile are downwardly rigid and that a 
kind of index-linking operates. Although the results 
of collective bargaining are to some extent taken as 
a reference price in setting wage levels, their value 
is purely indicative for the universe of workers not 
covered by collective instruments. It is well known that 
the coverage of collective instruments in Chile is very 
limited, so this mechanism would not be expected to be 
the predominant one. In recent years, furthermore, there 
has been a downward trend in the number of workers 
included in collective instruments of any kind.
To give an idea, 4,046 instruments were recorded 
as being in force in 2005, covering 343,420 workers.6 
4 Labour Office, Labour Relations Department, Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security.
5 Labour Office, Labour Relations Department, Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security.
6 These figures were obtained by adding together the numbers for 
collective instruments concluded in 2004 and 2005, since they last 
at least two years (Dirección Nacional del Trabajo, 2005).
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In other words, just 10.6% of private-sector workers are 
covered by clauses of this type. Furthermore, this rate is 
significantly lower than it was in 1997, when collective 
bargaining covered 14.4% of private-sector workers. 
Thus, even if all collective instruments included index-
linking clauses of this type, it does not seem reasonable 
to think that this would lead to rigidity in the wage 
structure of the private sector as a whole.
The remaining workers, meanwhile, do not have 
any such explicit coverage. For them, the pay increases 
established in collective instruments are only a reference 
price that may be taken into account when their wages 
are set, but is not binding on the parties. For this 
segment, the only legally binding limit is the minimum 
wage.
An important question is whether it is real wages 
or nominal wages that are set by employers in the 
segment without collective coverage. In most cases, 
each company sets the nominal wages of its workers. To 
determine them, employers go by market wages (taking 
into account the information in collective agreements), 
recent inflation and forecasts for the conditions in 
which each company will have to operate. In addition 
to considerations of inflation and company projections, 
however, things like improved qualifications, individual 
performance and years of service are also taken into 
account when wages are set. In these cases, the real 
wage is known only at the end of the period analysed, 
and this information is important for measuring the 
change in purchasing power.
Average growth in nominal wages, whether 
hourly or monthly, began to fall steadily from 1995 
onward, from 13.6% that year to 1.2% in 2005. This 
downward trend in the average wage increases granted 
by companies was not noticed until 2004 because the 
CPI rose by even less, resulting in positive real wage 
growth (figure 3). In 2004, the CPI varied by a mere 
1%, while in 2005 the figure was 3.2%
When setting wages, companies consider the level 
of inflation in the period immediately beforehand. 
Although there was an expectation of lower inflation 
in the second half of the 1990s, since this was a 
fundamental objective of Central Bank monetary 
policy, the reduction might not have been expected to 
be as fast and effective as it ultimately proved to be. 
Furthermore, the recession resulting from the Asian 
crisis undoubtedly caused inflation to fall by more 
than anticipated.
The clearest example of this can be found in 2004. 
The average wage increase recorded that year was 
2.9%. Since inflation in the period was an unusually 
low (1.1%), the average hourly wage rose by 1.8% in 
real terms. Conversely, if inflation had been close to 
the levels of recent years and the Central Bank target 
(2.1%), as might have been expected, wages would 
hardly have changed at all in real terms. If we also 
consider that wage increases ought to reflect increases 
in qualifications, productivity and years of service, 
it becomes even clearer that wage rises were very 
moderate in the period.
FIGURE 2
Chile: Initial real-term increases. Basic pay in collective bargaining, 1996-2005
(Percentages)
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For the coming years, it is important to bear 
in mind that, by contrast with the situation in the 
1990s, the inflation rate in Chile can be deemed to 
have stabilized at a rate of 2.5% or 3%, and it is not 
reasonable to expect real wages to be boosted by falling 
inflation. Thus, nominal wage rises at these same levels 
will be doing no more than compensate for inflation. 
Again, the lower the level of inflation in a country, the 
less reliance can be placed on “inflation flexibility” 
as a source of wage adjustment. This being so, the 
success of the price stability policy operated by the 
Central Bank of Chile has reduced companies’ room 
for manoeuvre and made it necessary to seek other 
sources of flexibility.
FIGURE 3
Chile: Average nominal monthly wage and the consumer price index, 1995-2005
(Annual variations)
Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) remuneration survey.
IV
The silent wage adjustment
Besides the trend towards lower wage rises discussed 
above, there has been a low-key wage adjustment 
process which has gone largely unremarked upon by 
analysts, and which concerns the differing trends of the 
monthly and hourly remuneration indexes. While hourly 
wages are an important indicator for analysing labour 
productivity, monthly wages are a better indicator of 
workers’ consumption capacity. For example, given 
constant wages, if the amount of time worked were 
to fall then the hourly wage would increase, while the 
purchasing power of that wage (best reflected by the 
monthly wage) would remain unchanged. Figure 4 
shows the trend followed by the two series, revealing 
that the average real monthly wage has consistently 
grown more slowly than the real hourly wage.
The first significant difference is seen in 1998 and 
1999, when the effects of the Asian crisis were being 
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companies, which were reflected in the unemployment 
rate, the wage series show a difference that derives 
from a reduction in hours worked (another form of 
adjustment). Undoubtedly, this reduction in hours was 
largely confined to overtime. Although the remuneration 
index does not include overtime pay, its does record 
the number of hours worked. Thus, while real hourly 
wages apparently continued to grow by 2.5%, workers’ 
real monthly take-home pay was actually rising far 
more slowly, by 1.3%, without considering the loss of 
additional pay because of overtime cutbacks.
There was also a large difference between hourly 
and monthly wage developments in 2001 and 2002. 
Whereas the hourly wage grew by 1.8%, the monthly 
wage rose by a mere 0.4%. In this second period, the 
divergence between the two series might have been 
partly due to the progressive reduction of the working 
week from 48 to 45 hours, as provided by the Labour 
Reform. The most significant difference, however, arose 
in 2005, when the new 45-hour working week came 
fully into force. According to the remuneration survey, 
the number of hours worked fell by 3.7% in 2005, 
indicating that most firms left it to the last moment to 
make the working time adjustment. This is borne out 
by the INE household survey data (table 1).
In 2005, the lowest increase in nominal monthly 
wages since the series began in 1993 (just 1.2%) was 
combined with a large reduction in hours worked, 
while inflation picked up (from 1% in 2004 to 3.2% in 
2005). Thus, while the real hourly wage rose by 1.9%, 
the real monthly wage fell by the same amount. Going 
by this indicator, then, in 2005 workers saw the first 
drop in their real purchasing power since the return to 
FIGURE 4
Chile: Average hourly and monthly wages, 1995-2005
(Annual variations)
Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) remuneration survey.
TABLE 1
Chile: Variation in hours worked, 2000-2005








Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data 
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Real average hourly wageReal average monthly wage
Reductions in hours
due to Asian crisis
Reductions in hours
due to cut in working 
week from 48 to 45 hours
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Until 1997, the minimum wage tracked average wages 
in the economy very closely. From 1998 onward, 
however, these two wage categories followed sharply 
divergent paths. This gap was the result of the three-
yearly adjustment system established in March 1998. 
While the expected inflation rate on which it was based 
followed the forecast trend, productivity gains proved 
far more modest than anticipated (figure 5).
Without a doubt, the emphasis on raising the 
minimum wage led to a greater concentration of wage 
earners at levels close to the minimum. Whereas in 
1998 some 28% of non-agricultural private-sector 
workers earned up to 1.5 times the minimum wage, 
by 2000 this proportion had risen to 35%.7 In some 
sectors, such as construction, average wages for 
unskilled workers were barely more than the minimum 
wage (in 2003, the minimum wage represented 94% 
of the average wage for unskilled workers in this 
industry).
A remarkable amount of emphasis has been 
placed on minimum wage policy. Although it is very 
positive that increases in the minimum wage have been 
sustained over time, starting from a very low base, it 
has to be asked whether this is the best policy for the 
goal being pursued, or for optimum labour market 
performance.
Regarding the first question, the main objective 
of the minimum wage is to protect the lowest-paid 
workers, especially those who are not represented in 
any way or covered by a collective instrument. Since 
the early 1990s, when it was increased substantially 
in relation to market wages, the minimum wage has 
fulfilled this purpose. While it remains low compared 
to workers’ needs, there can be no doubt that their 
purchasing power has increased substantially. Again, 
successive increases were on the whole very well 
absorbed by companies until 1997. In the 1998-2000 
period, on the other hand, companies were unable to 
pass on the percentage increase in the minimum wage 
up the whole of their wage scale, as had happened in 
earlier years, and the result was a greater concentration 
of workers at levels close to the minimum wage. In 
that period, many companies, especially smaller ones 
and those operating in particular sectors, had difficulty 
paying the minimum wage. To this extent, it seems 
to have adversely affected the working of the labour 
market.
There have also been questions about the effect 
of the minimum wage in reducing poverty and 
improving income distribution. Although it has been 
important in both cases, especially the former, it is 
not reasonable to think that it is the only wage policy 
instrument that might serve to improve both aspects. 
Again, while both poverty and income inequality 
are addressed through social policies, wage policy 
ought to be an important element, particularly when 
it comes to reducing inequality. Clearly, though, a 
wage policy whose only instrument is the minimum 
wage is going to be too weak to attain this goal. It is 
therefore essential to strengthen collective bargaining 
arrangements in which the minimum wage is only the 
base of a system capable of reconciling the different 
situations found in the various sectors of activity and 
in different companies.
V
A jarring note: the real minimum wage
7 According to the author’s own calculations from the 1998 and 
2000 CASEN surveys.
linked to the growth of their real take-home wages, it 
is clear that low monthly wage increases account for 
the slowness of the recovery in domestic demand, with 
all the constraints this implies for economic growth. It 
can also be held partly responsible for the weakness 
of economic growth in 2006, when international 
conditions were ideal.
democracy. In a way, the cost of shortening the working 
day was transferred to workers.
Besides what happened in 2005, it is clear that the 
real wages received by workers (and paid by employers) 
have not risen by as much as it appears when the 
average hourly wage series is considered in isolation. 
Since the growth of workers’ purchasing power is 
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FIGURE 5
Chile: Average real monthly wage and real minimum wage, 1995-2005
(Annual variations)
Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) remuneration survey.
VI
Should there be a special minimum
wage for the young?
Since the youth unemployment rate is double the 
average, one of the most frequently voiced proposals 
for improving wage flexibility has been to establish 
a special minimum wage for young workers.8 The 
reasoning here is that the minimum wage acts as an 
entry-level wage for young people starting work and 
that its current level is an obstacle for them since, 
for a given wage level, companies prefer people with 
work experience, believing it to be indicative of higher 
productivity. Thus, if young people had an entry wage 
lower than the general minimum wage, there would 
be an incentive to hire them that would correct the 
imbalance currently existing in the labour market. At 
present, there is a differentiated minimum wage for 
young people under 18, equivalent to 75% of the adult 
minimum wage.
To determine whether this theory holds good, 
what is needed is a more detailed analysis of how the 
youth labour force is distributed in comparison with 
the adult labour force. If we find that young people are 
underrepresented in formal private-sector companies, 
this will confirm that there is some obstacle to their 
recruitment. We shall not take under-18s into account 
here, since they already have a minimum wage lower 
than the general one and they are few in number; 
besides, it seems better to encourage them to remain 
in the education system until they have completed their 
formal studies than to ease them into the labour market 
early with few qualifications.
Accordingly, what we shall do here is compare 
the employment situation of the young economically 
active population (EAP), i.e., those aged between 
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FIGURE 6
Chile: Distribution of the youth and adult economically active population (EAP), 2003
(Percentages)
Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data from the 2003 CASEN survey.
a Urban informal sector.
EAP aged 25 and over. Right away, we see that in 
2003 the percentage of young people working in the 
private sector was larger than the percentage of adults 
(53% and 48%, respectively). We also observe large 
differences in the percentages of workers employed in 
the informal sector (11% of young people and 22% of 
adults) and in the public sector (4% of young people 
and 10% of adults), while percentage participation in 
the agricultural sector is very similar for young people 
and adults (figure 6).
It might be expected, however, that young people 
in formal jobs would more frequently be employed 
under insecure conditions, to avoid paying the minimum 
wage. This is the case to some extent in private-sector 
companies, domestic service and the public sector, 
where a smaller percentage of young people than of 
adults are employed under contract (figure 7).
To summarize, the problem seems to lie not so 
much in the private sector as in the inability of young 
people to establish themselves as self-employed 
(7% of the youth EAP and 18% of the adult EAP) 
and the difficulty they have in entering the public 
sector, where employment contracts seem to be given 
for preference to people who have more training and 
experience, and are thus older. Lowering the minimum 
wage would clearly not solve these problems, nor does 
it seem reasonable to think that all young people should 
be wage earners in the private sector. Accordingly, 
creating a minimum wage for young people does not 
seem the most appropriate policy.
In addition, we need to ask whether it is advisable 
to encourage young people to take up poorly paid 
jobs at an early age by establishing a low minimum 
wage, or whether it is better to encourage them 
to stay in the education system. The demands of 
globalization would seem to indicate that this second 
strategy is the more appropriate one, as it would yield 
a workforce that is more highly educated, and with 
greater development potential. The recent extension 
of compulsory education certainly comes down on the 
side of this second option.
The data categorically bear out the difficulty 
young people have in entering the labour market. 
What our analysis of the distribution of the youth EAP 
suggests to us, however, is that it is not “price” but 
other factors that play the preponderant role in this. 
These factors include the lack of relevance of formal 
education curricula to the world of work, the low value 
set by society on technical skills, a lack of experience 
and resources for starting up small-scale enterprises, 
and the slow growth of public-sector employment, for 
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VII
Worker profit-sharing: a variable 
component of remunerations?
We said earlier that the INE remuneration index did not 
take account of bonuses and profit-sharing payments 
that were not disbursed monthly or of overtime 
payments (variable components of remuneration), so 
that we did not know the size of these components 
in the universe covered by the survey. We do know, 
however, that under the provisions of the Labour Code,9 
companies required to keep accounts are obliged to 
give their workers a share of their profits.10
According to the specialist literature, such 
components of total worker remuneration are a basic 
element of flexibility. While significant amounts are 
distributed on this basis at times when profits are high, 
in periods of crisis these components are automatically 
adjusted in companies as profits decline (or disappear) 
and so, accordingly, are the workers’ share of them 
(Weitzman, 1984). If Chile has an instrument of 
this type, why do we not see a cushioning effect on 
employment in periods of recession like the one that 
recently ended?
Part of the answer is to be found in the specifications 
of the Chilean profit-sharing model. Although the 
percentage to be distributed is set at 30% (article 47), 
the Labour Code establishes an alternative that releases 
companies from this obligation: that of paying workers 
a proportion of their annual wage (25%), with a ceiling 
9 Chile, Código del Trabajo, Capítulo V: de las remuneraciones, 
articles 47 to 52.
10 Net profit is calculated by deducting 10% from the amount declared 
for corporation tax (without deducting losses from previous years) 
as return on the employer’s equity.
FIGURE 7
Chile: Distribution of employment by contractual status, youths and adults, 2003
(Percentages)
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per worker of 4.75 times the minimum wage (article 
50). The combination of these two limiting factors 
means that any worker earning more than 1.6 times 
the minimum wage11 (204,000 pesos as of July 2005) 
receives less than 25% of his or her annual wage.
This alternative allows companies making large 
profits to limit what they distribute by way of profit-
sharing, with a ceiling that is also quite low. Thus, the 
higher a company’s profits, the lower the percentage 
that will be distributed on a profit-sharing basis.
According to the minimum wage values in force 
since 1 July 2005, the maximum profit share per 
worker is 605,625 pesos (4.75 x 127,500 pesos). This 
amount applies to all workers earning more than 1.6 
times the minimum wage (or 204,000 pesos a month 
given the same minimum wage). Workers who earn 
exactly the minimum wage each month will receive 
a maximum share of three times the minimum wage, 
since a ceiling of 25% of the annual wage is applied 
(i.e., 382,500 pesos).
To better illustrate how the profit-sharing system 
works, we shall take as an example a company with 
100 workers whose wages exceed 1.6 times the 
minimum wage each month (i.e., 204,000 pesos). Table 
2 presents hypothetical profits ranging from 5.8 million 
pesos (equivalent to US$ 10,000) to 5.8 billion pesos 
(equivalent to US$ 10 million).12 The third column 
of the table shows that when the company’s profits 
are 5.8 million pesos or 58 million pesos, it has to 
distribute 30% of these profits among its workforce, 
since the amounts to be distributed are less than 25% of 
annual remuneration and than 4.75 times the minimum 
wage. If the company has profits of 580 million pesos, 
however, it will suit it to apply article 50, under which 
it can pay its workers 25% of their annual wages with a 
ceiling of 4.75 times the minimum wage. Thus, instead 
of having to distribute 174 million pesos among its 
workers (30% of profits), it will have to distribute 
60.5 million (100 x 4.75 x 127,500), i.e., 10.4% of its 
profits. If its profits were 5.8 billion pesos, it would 
have to distribute a mere 1% of this amount.
According to the 2004 ENCLA, 12% of the 
companies surveyed distributed 30% of profits, 75% 
paid bonuses in accordance with article 50, 8% 
paid some other type of bonus exceeding the legal 
requirement under the terms of a collective agreement, 
and the rest paid no bonus. Payment of bonuses under 
the 30% of profits rule or some negotiated formula 
becomes more common as company size increases. 
Whereas only 10% of microenterprises and small 
businesses pay out 30% of profits, the proportion of 
large companies doing so is 18%.
Companies have to choose between the two 
alternatives each year. In the opinion of a consultant 
who advises companies, “the article 50 formula has 
its advantages from the financial point of view, as it 
allows the annual budget to be planned and there are 
no surprises” (Peñaloza, 2005).
Another very useful way of reaching a better 
understanding of how this instrument is actually 
applied in practice is to analyse the periodicity with 
TABLE 2
Employment: Company with 100 workers earning more than 
1.6 times the minimum wage a montha b
 Company profits Profits to be distributed Worker share
 (millions of pesos) to workers of profits
 Articles of the Labour Code   (millions of pesos) (percentages)
 5.8 Art. 47 1.7 30.0
 58 Art. 47 17.3 30.0
 580 Art. 50 60.5 10.4
 5 800 Art. 50 60.5 1.0
a Equivalent to 204,000 pesos a month given the minimum wage in force since 1 July 2005 (127,500 pesos).
b Maximum share per worker: 605,625 pesos (4.75 x 127,500 pesos).
11 This threshold of 1.6 times the minimum wage (MW) is arrived 
at by resolving the equation (12*X)*25%=4.75 MW, where X is 
the monthly wage.
12 In the interests of simplification, the 10% for the return on the 
employer’s equity has not been deducted from the profit figures.
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which payments are made on this basis. According to 
the 2004 ENCLA, in cases where 30% of profits are 
paid out the most common frequency is once a year 
(78% of cases). Among companies that opt to pay 25% 
of annual remuneration, on the other hand, the usual 
periodicity is monthly (84% of cases). In the latter case, 
this portion of earnings merges into basic pay because 
of the regularity with which it is paid each month and 
the uniformity of the amounts, so that it is captured 
by the INE remuneration survey.
From everything analysed here, three conclusions 
can be drawn. First, the limits established by the law 
favour companies with higher profits. Second, it is clear 
that the larger a company’s profits, the less important 
the variable component is as a cushion in times of 
recession. Lastly, most companies opt in practice to 
apply article 50, giving rise to payment of a fixed sum 
that in most cases is distributed monthly, supplementing 
basic pay.
All this indicates that while company profit-
sharing is typically categorized as a variable instrument, 
it has actually become just another component of 
fixed remuneration. What is being lost by this is the 
possibility of having a cushioning element in place in 
the event of a recession that affects company profits. 
It would be worth conducting an in-depth examination 
to determine whether the profit-sharing system as 
currently applied is the most suitable instrument at the 
present time. Although it is during periods of recession 
that calls for wage flexibility are heard, it is only if 
substantial sums are distributed during growth periods 
that a margin of adjustment will be available. It is not 
reasonable to expect that already low wages can be 
cut significantly in the event of a crisis. This margin 
should be generated during periods of growth like the 
one Chile is currently experiencing.
VIII
Variable wages in some sectors
While it is true that making a portion of worker 
remuneration variable really does offer an alternative 
to adjusting employment in a situation of crisis, it is 
important for this variable component to possess certain 
characteristics. For example, the variable part must 
not be a very large proportion of total pay. Otherwise, 
the effect would be to safeguard the interests of the 
company at the cost of passing on all the risk to 
workers, who might see their total income reduced to 
levels insufficient to meet their basic needs.
This very situation has been complained of on 
some occasions, as there are companies in the commerce 
sector that calculate all remuneration on the basis of 
sales made. While it is common in commerce for a 
portion of remuneration to be based on sales, it is 
also usual for workers to have a basic salary paid each 
month by way of compensation for the time worked, 
their experience and their training for the job, among 
other factors.
Another basic condition for variable components 
is that they must be designed with a view to optimizing 
the way work is performed in every respect. An incentive 
system is badly designed if it results in higher productivity 
but at the cost of product quality, something that is also 
applicable to services. For example, in the system of 
remuneration used by bus operators in the Chilean capital 
pending implementation of the new public transport plan, 
Transantiago, the more tickets drivers sell the more they 
are paid, with the result that they are more interested in 
picking up passengers than in obeying traffic rules or 
operating the service as the timetable requires. In this 
case, a monetary incentive has resulted in lower service 
quality and greater risk on the roads.
Lastly, there are a number of occupations where 
the link between the company and the worker is limited 
to the performance of a specific piece of work for a 
certain period of time, as happens in construction. 
The volatility of remuneration in this sector arises 
not while contracts are in force but every time a job 
is completed and the worker is hired again for a new 
one. This means that the worker is forced to carry 
out pay negotiations very frequently, sometimes more 
than once a year. Given that the construction sector 
is characterized by low pay, those working there are 
poorly placed when they come to look for a new job 
because in most cases they lack the savings to cope 
with periods of unemployment and have not paid 
social security contributions in sufficient quantities 
or for long enough to benefit from unemployment 
insurance.
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Contrary to the perception of those who believe wages 
in Chile are rigid, a more detailed analysis indicates 
that they did adjust in various ways during the crisis 
period. First, in the case of wages determined by 
collective instruments, initial increases were reduced 
in real terms. Second, the number of hours worked was 
adjusted, resulting in monthly wages that were broadly 
stable. Lastly, real wage increases were possible, but 
mainly because inflation fell to levels even lower than 
expected. The minimum wage moved against this trend, 
continuing to rise strongly despite the crisis.
One striking thing in the particular case of the 
minimum wage is that throughout the period when 
adjustments were being implemented every three 
years, employers’ organizations did not speak out 
about the discrepancy between the resulting increases 
and developments in the economy. Two factors must 
certainly be at work here. First, we know that the 
minimum wage is the actual wage for many people 
employed by smaller companies. It is possible that 
employers in the upper reaches of business were 
not sufficiently aware of how seriously their smaller 
counterparts were being affected by this decision, and 
were not pressed by them to represent their interests 
more actively.
The second and probably more important factor 
is that the periodic consultations conducted by the 
government whenever the minimum wage is due to 
be set have not followed a formal institutionalized 
procedure whereby all parties are provided with a 
basic report prepared by a special expert committee 
and can present their own technical reports to back 
up their own positions. Under these circumstances, 
employers’ representatives appear to have held back 
from a debate whose primary focus was political. 
There seems to be a need to consider whether it is 
advisable for consultations among the actors concerned 
to follow the same format as hitherto or whether it 
would be more helpful to institutionalize a procedure 
that encourages not just the active participation of 
actors in the debate but also the provision of useful 
technical information.
Still on the subject of this negotiating deficit, 
there needs to be an in-depth analysis of collective 
bargaining arrangements. The persistent decline in the 
proportion of wage earners involved in such bargaining 
is worrying, as it means that an important instrument 
for establishing more modern labour relations is being 
neglected. Again, there is a need for dialogue between 
the parties to resolve situations of unstable employment 
and hence working conditions that characterize specific 
sectors, as indicated when the subject of wage-setting 
in the construction sector was looked at.
Something that will have to be kept very much 
in mind over the coming years is that the success 
of macroeconomic policy, and monetary policy in 
particular, has led to low inflation, reducing the 
“inflation flexibility” of wages. Logically enough, this 
situation has led to a concern to introduce a variable 
component into pay. A review of current legislation 
shows that the Labour Code provides for workers 
to receive a share of company profits, which is an 
appropriate instrument for cushioning the effect of 
recessions by reducing labour costs, and for distributing 
revenues in periods of profitability in accordance with 
the contribution made by workers.
The great majority of companies, however, prefer 
to apply the alternative formula provided for, which 
sets an upper limit on the amounts to be distributed per 
worker and thus makes the total distribution easier to 
IX
Conclusions
According to the INE remuneration index for the 
construction sector, in 2004 the real hourly wage in 
this sector was three percentage points lower than in 
1997 and had remained unchanged for over three years, 
despite the strong upturn in activity. Real monthly 
wages in construction, meanwhile, have fallen steadily 
since 1997, so that by 2004 they were 20% lower than 
in that year.
The characteristics described (high job turnover 
and low wages) suggest that in this particular case 
there is a need to re-establish sectoral bargaining 
arrangements so that an effective wage floor can be 
set by agreement between the parties. The levels thus 
agreed upon would provide a basis for companies 
to compete within a framework of relatively stable 
employment conditions.
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APPENDIX
Chile: Wage indicators, 1995-2005
(Annual variations)
Year Real average  Real average  Real monthly  Nominal average  Nominal average  Nominal monthly  Consumer 
 monthly wagea hourly wagea minimum wagea monthly wagea hourly wagea minimum wagea price indexa
1995 5.0 4.8 4.5 13.6 13.5 13.1 8.2
1996 3.4 4.1 4.2 11.0 11.8 11.9 7.4
1997 2.6 2.4 3.6 8.8 8.7 9.9 6.1
1998 1.5 2.7 5.1 6.4 7.9 1..3 5.1
1999 1.2 2.4 8.9 4.5 5.8 12.5 3.3
2000 1.2 1.4 7.2 5.0 5.3 11.2 3.8
2001 0.4 1.6 3.3 3.9 5.2 6.9 3.6
2002 0.5 2.0 3.1 3.0 4.6 5.6 2.5
2003 0.6 0.9 1.8 3.5 3.8 4.6 2.8
2004 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 1.1
2005 -1.9 1.9 1.8 1.2 5.0 5.0 3.2
Source: Prepared by the International Labour Office (ILO) with data from the Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INE).
a Average annual variation.
predict. In this way, a “variable” instrument becomes 
another “fixed” component of pay. Given that it is 
companies that decide how to apply the profit-sharing 
instrument, we must assume that in making this choice 
they see the desirability for the company of limiting 
profit distribution and, should a period of crisis occur, 
adjusting working hours and possibly employment.
For many years now, therefore, profit-sharing has 
not provided what the labour market currently needs 
to work better. There are not many examples in Latin 
America of practices that might provide material for 
reflection in Chile, although the case of Brazil may 
well be of interest. In the mid-1990s, the country 
introduced a provision for workers to share in the 
profits of companies or specific production results; with 
an obligation for the parties to negotiate, albeit with a 
wide margin of discretion as to the formula ultimately 
adopted. The objective in Brazil was to encourage more 
harmonious labour relations so as to improve company 
performance while at the same time rewarding the 
workers who made this possible.13 It offers companies 
the opportunity of setting agreed targets to improve 
their performance and competitiveness. This strategy 
clearly fits well with Chile’s ongoing integration into 
world trade, which will force the country to make a 
great effort to modernize labour relations, starting with 
recognition of the need for solid worker representation 
and a system of bipartite dialogue. Lastly, although 
calls for flexibility are usually heard when periods of 
recession begin, it must be understood that flexibility 
can only materialize if substantial sums are distributed 
to workers during periods of growth to reward them 
for their contribution to higher profits. As was said 
earlier, it is not reasonable to expect that already low 
wages14 can be cut significantly during a crisis. The 
variable component of pay could serve this purpose, 
however, and accordingly it ought to be introduced at 
a time of strong economic growth, like the one Chile 
is currently experiencing.
(Original: Spanish)
14 According to the 2003 CASEN survey, 60% of wage earners 
received less than twice the minimum wage (Marinakis and Velasco, 
2006).13 See Marinakis (1999) for further information.
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